07/04/2010 – Public Ministery indicates grave failures and seeks annulment of Belo Monte license. Between 1976 and 2002, only 70% of the time, the Xingu river had enough water for the planned energy generation.

 

Prosecutors cite opinions of technicians from IBAMA itself: if constructed as planned, the hydroelectric plant could desiccate 100 km of the great Xingu river and compromise water and food supply for the populations.

 

Affront to Constitution

The Ministério Publico Federal (MPF-Federal Prosecutors Office) will adjudicate, tomorrow (Thursday, 8) the public civil action in the Federal Court of Altamira for the annulment of the preliminary license of the hydroelectric plant of Belo Monte, issued by IBAMA. The federal prosecutors who analyzed the enterprise indicate an affront to the Constitution, to environmental laws and to resolutions of the National Environmental Council among the eight problems encountered in licensing so far.

 

The MPF also seeks cancellation of the auction scheduled for April 20 because the government defied one of the Conama requirements for licensing of hydroelectric plants. The project can only go to auction after an installation permit is issued, never with just the provisional [environmental] license. This is stated in resolution No. 06/1987, clearly defied in the urgency to sell Belo Monte in 2010.

 

The petition by the Public Ministry also includes a prohibition for the IBAMA, so that any new license is granted only if all defects and questions are corrected in the licensing process.

The MPF will also notify eight corporations potentially interested in the venture on the terms of the legal action, to cooperate to avoid the damage and illegalities described, as they can be considered co-responsible. Among those notified are BNDES and the three largest contractors in the country (see list below)

 

Lack of data

The MPF discovered by analyzing the material from IBAMA, that the government’s own technicians have made clear, in several documents, their discomfort with the lack of scientific data that would ensure the environmental safety of the project. The pressure to grant the license overrode not only legal and democratic principles, but undermined the principle of precaution, essential to avoid environmental disasters.

 

Water flow versus Biodiversity

Among the primary questions is in respect to biodiversity and the survival of the population of what is called the Volta Grande region of the Xingu, a 100 km stretch of the river to be diverted to the dam for energy production. One of the main issues in licensing of Belo Monte concerns the amount of water that will be released to "irrigate" this stretch, baptized by Eletrobrás as the Stretch of Reduced Flow [Trecho de Vazão Reduzida].

 

In the initial proposal of Eletrobrás, this stretch, where at least 12 thousand families live, including the Arara and Juruna indigenous peoples, would be irrigated with 4 thousand cubic meters per second, or 8 thousand m3/s, in alternate years. IBAMA technicians consider 4 thousand m3 / s to be a negligible amount of water, which could jeopardize the life in the region. The license was issued conditioned on a test: for six years, 8 thousand m3 / s would be released. At the end of this period, environmental damage would be reassessed.

 

"Ibama talks about testing a hydrograph with that amount of water, but the environment and the lives of people of the Xingu cannot be dependent on tests. If there is no scientific certainty about the project, it should not move forward. This is an environmental principle from which society cannot desist”, said District Attorney Terre Cláudio do Amaral, of Altamira, one of those responsible for the analysis.

 

Unsufficient for power generation

To make matters worse for the residents of the Xingu, technicians of the Public Ministry (MPF) demonstrated that neither of the two formulas – neither that of IBAMA, nor of Eletrobrás – are consistent with reality. They analyzed the volume of water of the Xingu in historical series from 1971 to 2006. Considering that the turbines will only generate power if 14 thousand m3/s of water is flowing through them. Added to this volume the 8 thousand m3/s required by IBAMA to get to the volume of 22 thousand m3/s, necessary to reconcile energy and maintain life. The MPF discovered that in the 35 years observed, 70% of the time the river was not able to reach this volume even during the season greatest volume.

 

"If the Xingu does not have sufficient water to generate energy and at the same time, to maintain the volume required by IBAMA, we question what will be sacrificed, the generation of power or the lives of people. With a question of that magnitude, how can the enterprise be considered viable?", questioned District Attorney Ubiratan Cazetta.

 

Little water or water of poor quality

In addition to the threat, literally, of lack of water for life on the Volta Grande, in the analysis of licensing documents, another scientific question of equal gravity becomes evident regarding the quality of water in the stretch of river that will be transformed into a lake.

 

In that document delivered to IBAMA on 27/01, four days prior to the issuing of the provisional license, specialists at Brasilia University stressed that more time was necessary to draw conclusions about water quality after construction, because there is evidence of toxicity to fish and humans.

 

"The analysts are of the opinion that there is no decision at this time in relation to the enterprise and suggest that more time be given to perform any future analysis”, says the document. But they were ignored by IBAMA that, in the license, raised the question as one of the vaguest conditions: "Water quality should be ensured."

 

Not only were scientists of the UNB ignored. In an unprecedented effort, 39 scientists from various Brazilian institutions gathered to critically analyze the enterprise of Belo Monte and submitted to IBAMA, during the public hearings, a defense of the conclusions that were not taken into consideration. "We did not analyze the contributions of public hearings”, admitted the technicians in one of the last documents issued before the provisional license. Unprecedented

 

Legal lacunas

The MPF also points to the disregard for Article 176 of the Federal Constitution, which determines that utilization of hydrological potential in indigenous lands could only be done if there is no specific law regulating the issue. The Brazilian legislature never addressed the issue. And until now, the Brazilian government has never attempted to make use of hydrological potential on Indian land.

 

"Belo Monte is, also from this point of view, an enterprise without precedents. And, for the MPF, nothing can continue as long as legal lacunas are not attended to. Hydrological utilization in indigenous lands is in the same category as mineral exploitation. No authorization is possible as long as these issues are not regulated”, explains Bruno Attorney Gutschow, of Altamira.

 

For the MPF, by releasing the environmental license with so many doubts and risks, the government resolved to wager and leave for later ascertainments to whether the enterprise is in fact viable. "This signifies, in an unconstitutional manner, to render to the absolute principle of “economic development" and ignorance as to the validity of the constitutional principle of sustainable development," states the public civil action that Justice will address tomorrow.

 

First law suit

The lawsuit is the first consequence of the analysis that six federal prosecutors conducted regarding the licensing documents, the legal foundation and consequences of the project for indigenous and non-indigenous populations of the Xingu River. The group continues to analyze the documents of the enterprise and new judicial actions are not discarded.

 

Below, one by one, the irregularities found so far by the MPF:

 

1 – It is the first time an enterprise directly affects indigenous land, utilizing hydrological resource of indigenous lands and the Constitution requires, in Article 176, that such use may only be authorized by the government after enactment of common law regulation on the question, which does not exist in Brazilian law.

 

2 – The team of technicians who made the licensing consigned to a public documents: "There has been no analysis of the contributions of public hearings." The Federal Constitution states that Brazil, as a democratic state of law, it must ensure popular participation. And in the case of a license, such participation can not be merely formal. Making a public hearing and ignore what the public says is contrary to democratic principles. In the specific case of Belo Monte, ignore society is even more unfortunate because for the first time, scientists from several institutions met to discuss the project and help with licensing, but were not considered properly.

 

3 – Precautionary principle: When in doubt about severe impacts, the project can not be executed. Belo Monte left doubts about the hydrograph due to the 100 km of the great revolution that will be affected by river diversion. Eletrobrás originally proposed a flow that would be up to 4000 m3 / s in a year, and 8000 m3 / s in the following year. IBAMA ordered the hydrograph. But neither are sure that proposed on the hydrograph, ie, 8000 m3 / s in all years. IBAMA speaks of "test" this flow for six years and then evaluate the impacts. Can not do "tests" of its kind when it comes to environmental issues, or if unsure of what will happen or the project can not go forward.

 

4 – Water quality: Another uncertainty is evident in the analysis of technical IBAMA is about water quality if the plant is built. At various points, those responsible for licensing say they worried about projections of toxicity to humans and fish. Talk about "the impact of great magnitude possibly irreversible." In the opinion of 27.01 days (four days before the license be granted), experts from the University of Brasilia advised that if they waited longer before any decision on the venture, that further analysis on the topic could be made. IBAMA analysts themselves, in 29/01, so two days before the license is issued, recognized the lack of data and said the issue was pending. Even so, the license was granted and the matter went as conditioning.

 

5 – Obligation to assess mitigating measures. Once identified negative impacts, the government can only release a new development to analyze the measures proposed by the developer to mitigate or offset those impacts. CONAMA resolution specifically determines that. In the case of Belo Monte, no compensation measures were made before the previous license. If, for example, dams begin to form puddles on the river bed and the mosquito population to proliferate, nobody has a plan to avoid the increase of malaria cases.

 

6 – Stretch of Low Flow. The MPF has analyzed data from the National Water Agency showing that they are irreconcilable economic interests / energy and environmental issues. The Xingu River in 35 years analyzed, only reached 22 thousand m3 / s volume in 6% of days. If it takes 14 thousand m3 / s to produce energy and at least 8 thousand m3 / s to maintain life in the 100 km stretch of the reduced flow, it is evident that the plant will impose an absurd choice: either sacrifice the Tour Great sacrifices himself or power generation.

 

7 – Disobedience to Resolution No. 006/1987 of the National Council on the Environment. Resolution CONAMA is self-explanatory. Auction, only after the Installation License. The government did not wait and now may be forced by the courts to comply with the rules of the game.

 

8 – The need to re-issue the Declaration of Water Availability Reserve. The National Water Agency (ANA) has to "grant" the necessary water for power generation, because it is a public good. The ANA has granted it before the Previous Environmental License, and therefore this document does not provide the hydrograph which was amended by the technicians. It would require a new lease of ANA, with the changes predicted by IBAMA.

 

See who can be notified of the court handling the action and be liable for environmental damage:

 

(BNDES) Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social Constructora Norberto Odebrecht SA

Construções Trade and Camargo Correa S / S A

Andrade Gutierrez S/A

Companies Vale do Rio Doce.

Insurer Malucelli S/A

Fator Insurer / InsuranceS/A

UBF S / A